CHAPTER 5 : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AFRICA’S DIPLOMATIC AND GRASSROOTS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND TAIWAN

Taiwan and China have both used diplomatic relations with African countries to bolster their own global standing. During the 1960s, concerned about waning support for Taiwan’s continued presence on the UN Security Council, the US encouraged Taiwan to deepen agricultural development cooperation with newly independent African states (Liu, 2013). China, at the time excluded from the UN and competing with the Soviet Union, built relationships with newly independent African states and liberation movements, providing military training and development assistance; the most famous being the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway between 1970 and 1975 (Monson, 2009). In 1971, Beijing 2 prevailed over Taipei at the UN with the support of African countries. During the 1990s, Taiwan improved its diplomatic standing by offering some of the poorest African states generous development aid in exchange for diplomatic recognition (Taylor, 2002). Since the late 1990s, however, China has successfully reduced these gains from a peak of ten diplomatic partners in 1997.

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The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was first held in 2000 and 2003 as ministerial meetings, but the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation hosted in Beijing was organized as a full summit, involving 41 heads of state from 48 African states. It was given prominent media attention and China's first policy white paper on Africa was unveiled. Most importantly, specific commitments were made, including US$5 billion in financing, a pledge to double aid by 2009, the establishment of a China-Africa Development Fund with $5 billion in capital, and expanded infrastructure commitments (Grimm, 2012). Following FOCAC, there was a sharp increase in trade and investment with Africa, and economic relations have deepened further since. The forum set the pattern for subsequent triannual forums, during which trade deals, financing packages, and investment budgets were announced. For example, $60 billion in 2015, $60 billion in 2018, and $40 billion in 2021 (Sun 2021). Attendance at FOCAC and eligibility for financing and aid are premised on acceptance of the "One China Principle" and exclude countries that recognize Taiwan (although China did extend invitations to Taiwan's diplomatic partners to be “observers” during the early FOCAC). As of 2022, Eswatini remains Taiwan’s last diplomatic partner in Africa. Burkina Faso cut ties with Taiwan in 2018 just before that year’s FOCAC, during which China expressed hopes that Eswatini would one day “join the China-Africa family” (Gao, 2018).

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China’s diplomatic success has been supported by growing economic links over the same period. In this chapter, I answer three questions: 1) Have closer diplomatic relations with China contributed to improved economic performance in African countries? 2) Have closer diplomatic relations with China limited the policy space for African states to engage Taiwan? 3) How have Taiwanese business and civil society actors promoted informal relations between Taiwan and African countries in the absence of government-togovernment ties?

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To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on four case studies: two long-term African diplomatic partners of Taiwan which broke ties in order establish relations with China: Malawi (2008) and South Africa (1998); and two African countries which have never been diplomatic partners but are nonetheless two of Taiwan’s top trading partners in Africa: Angola and Nigeria. The chapter considers both the available economic data and the secondary literature evaluating these countries’ evolving relationships with China, with an eye on the implications for relations with Taiwan.1 The chapter also relies on extended interviews with 19 Taiwanese businesspeople, African diplomats in Taiwan and civil 3 society actors who have worked or lived in multiple African countries and played key roles in promoting informal relations. The choice of these countries and their interlocutors are not intended to be comprehensive in their representation of all Taiwan’s relations with Africa, but to shed light on the specific issues in question.

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​The findings of this chapter are that 1) a closer diplomatic relationship with China does not automatically translate into greater overall economic growth because there are many other factors affecting economic performance. 2) Likewise, greater economic dependency on China does not necessarily mean a reduction in a state’s policy space, meaning there may be more scope for informal engagements with Taiwan. 3) For Taiwan, the government’s emphasis on formal diplomatic ties and government-to-government relations may overlook how economic and social relations promoted by informal contacts have played a role in maintaining links between Taiwan and Africa.