

CHAPTER 5 : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AFRICA'S DIPLOMATIC AND GRASSROOTS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND TAIWAN

Derek Sheridan
Academia Sinica

Taiwan and China have both used diplomatic relations with African countries to bolster their global standing – but have African countries benefited from switching ties to, or maintaining ties with, China during the period of improving Africa-China economic relations? Have closer diplomatic relations with China contributed to improved economic performance in African countries? Furthermore, have closer diplomatic relations with Beijing limited the policy space for African states to engage Taiwan? Finally, how have Taiwanese business and civil society actors promoted informal relations between Taiwan and African countries in the absence of government-to-government ties? To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on four case studies: two long-term African diplomatic partners of Taiwan which broke ties in order to establish relations with China - Malawi (2008) and South Africa (1998); and two African countries which have never been diplomatic partners but are nonetheless two of Taiwan's top trading partners in Africa - Angola and Nigeria. The chapter considers available economic data, the secondary literature evaluating these countries' evolving relationships with China, and interviews with African diplomats, Taiwanese businesspeople, and civil society actors who have worked or lived in African countries and helped promote informal relations. The chapter finds that a closer diplomatic relationship with China does not automatically translate into greater overall economic growth; greater economic dependence on China does not translate into less space for economic engagement with Taiwan; and people-to-people relations may be more important for sustaining Taiwan's relations with Africa in the long run than state-to-state relations.

5.1 Introduction

Taiwan and China have both used diplomatic relations with African countries to bolster their own global standing. During the 1960s, concerned about waning support for Taiwan's continued presence on the UN Security Council, the US encouraged Taiwan to deepen agricultural development cooperation with newly independent African states (Liu, 2013). China, at the time excluded from the UN and competing with the Soviet Union, built relationships with newly independent African states and liberation movements, providing military training and development assistance; the most famous being the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway between 1970 and 1975 (Monson, 2009). In 1971, Beijing

prevailed over Taipei at the UN with the support of African countries. During the 1990s, Taiwan improved its diplomatic standing by offering some of the poorest African states generous development aid in exchange for diplomatic recognition (Taylor, 2002). Since the late 1990s, however, China has successfully reduced these gains from a peak of ten diplomatic partners in 1997.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was first held in 2000 and 2003 as ministerial meetings, but the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation hosted in Beijing was organized as a full summit, involving 41 heads of state from 48 African states. It was given prominent media attention and China's first policy white paper on Africa was unveiled. Most importantly, specific commitments were made, including US\$5 billion in financing, a pledge to double aid by 2009, the establishment of a China-Africa Development Fund with \$5 billion in capital, and expanded infrastructure commitments (Grimm, 2012). Following FOCAC, there was a sharp increase in trade and investment with Africa, and economic relations have deepened further since. The forum set the pattern for subsequent triannual forums, during which trade deals, financing packages, and investment budgets were announced. For example, \$60 billion in 2015, \$60 billion in 2018, and \$40 billion in 2021 (Sun 2021). Attendance at FOCAC and eligibility for financing and aid are premised on acceptance of the "One China Principle" and exclude countries that recognize Taiwan (although China did extend invitations to Taiwan's diplomatic partners to be "observers" during the early FOCAC). As of 2022, Eswatini remains Taiwan's last diplomatic partner in Africa. Burkina Faso cut ties with Taiwan in 2018 just before that year's FOCAC, during which China expressed hopes that Eswatini would one day "join the China-Africa family" (Gao, 2018).

China's diplomatic success has been supported by growing economic links over the same period. In this chapter, I answer three questions: 1) Have closer diplomatic relations with China contributed to improved economic performance in African countries? 2) Have closer diplomatic relations with China limited the policy space for African states to engage Taiwan? 3) How have Taiwanese business and civil society actors promoted informal relations between Taiwan and African countries in the absence of government-to-government ties?

To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on four case studies: two long-term African diplomatic partners of Taiwan which broke ties in order establish relations with China: Malawi (2008) and South Africa (1998); and two African countries which have never been diplomatic partners but are nonetheless two of Taiwan's top trading partners in Africa: Angola and Nigeria. The chapter considers both the available economic data and the secondary literature evaluating these countries' evolving relationships with China, with an eye on the implications for relations with Taiwan.¹ The chapter also relies on extended interviews with 19 Taiwanese businesspeople, African diplomats in Taiwan and civil

society actors who have worked or lived in multiple African countries and played key roles in promoting informal relations. The choice of these countries and their interlocutors are not intended to be comprehensive in their representation of all Taiwan's relations with Africa, but to shed light on the specific issues in question.

The findings of this chapter are that 1) a closer diplomatic relationship with China does not automatically translate into greater overall economic growth because there are many other factors affecting economic performance. 2) Likewise, greater economic dependency on China does not necessarily mean a reduction in a state's policy space, meaning there may be more scope for informal engagements with Taiwan. 3) For Taiwan, the government's emphasis on formal diplomatic ties and government-to-government relations may overlook how economic and social relations promoted by informal contacts have played a role in maintaining links between Taiwan and Africa.

5.2 Did Recognizing China Contribute to Economic Growth?

The common assumption is that countries recognize China to promote economic growth. However, many factors affect economic growth, and closer diplomatic relations with China don't automatically boost performance. In order to determine whether switching ties affects economic growth, a Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis was conducted for countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific (see Chapter 3). The fact that DID tests produce mixed results raises the question of why relations with China or Taiwan appear to help in some cases, but not in others (see Chapter 4). What are the causal factors? How do diplomatic relations with Beijing change a country's economic relations with China? How do these changes affect economic conditions? In order to evaluate this question, economic relations should be broken down into trade, FDI, aid, and finance.

The effects of trade between China and the Global South has been extensively debated. On the one hand, China's exports of manufactured goods have been found to be correlated with a decline in African manufacturing (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, 2016; Marukawa, 2017). On the other hand, China's demand for raw materials contributed to rising commodity prices, improving the economic performance of raw material exporters (Taylor, 2015). However, these are indirect effects through the global market rather than the direct effects of diplomatic relations. Establishing diplomatic relations with China may increase the volume of a country's exports to China, but it can also more rapidly increase the volume of its imports from China.

The more attractive aspect of diplomatic ties with China is attracting investment and financing. In order to be eligible for state-promoted investment packages and financing, it is necessary to be diplomatic partners with China and not with Taiwan. For example, economic packages and pledges have typically been announced during the triannual FOCAC, but only countries recognizing China have been invited. Nonetheless, China has

extended invitations to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners before to attend as observers, perhaps in order to advertise the promised benefits of switching. For countries seeking to diversify their economies, Chinese FDI has been concentrated in construction and manufacturing (Sun et al, 2017; Marukawa, 2017). Capital goods, like machinery, are also a significant component of Chinese imports, which contribute to local manufacturing (Munemo, 2013; Wolf, 2017). Some African countries, such as Ethiopia, have even sought to replicate the East Asian “flying geese model.” (Lin & Xu, 2019). The financing of infrastructure projects with Chinese loans has been more controversial because it has contributed to an unsustainable debt burden in many countries. On the other hand, improved infrastructure and continued financing is nonetheless necessary for long term economic growth (Ryder & Fu, 2021).

The economic effects of closer ties with China are not one-dimensional, and it also must be remembered that China is not the only relevant actor which affects economic performance. Therefore, the justification that closer diplomatic ties with China will deliver economic growth may burden Chinese and African leaders with higher expectations than they can deliver.

5.2.1 Case Study: Malawi

Shortly after Malawi broke ties with Taiwan to recognize China in 2008, President Bingu wa Muratharika is alleged to have “told the nation that Malawi will not only benefit from aid but also China’s rich experience. He said it would help turn Malawi from poverty to riches” (Mweninguwe, 2017). Did Malawi’s decision to switch contribute to Malawi’s economic growth?

Based on the methodology of Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis (see Chapter 3), comparing GDP per capita growth trends vis-à-vis Niger (the control country for the analysis) before and after recognition, Malawi’s economic performance began to slow during the six years following its establishment of ties with China. What happened?

The first effect of switching ties was increased trade volume. Malawi’s exports to China increased, doubling between 2007 and 2010, according to the Malawi Ministry of Trade (Ndzendze, 2019). Ndzendze argues that recognizing Taiwan may be costly for countries by denying them access to the larger Chinese market, and that the prospect of increasing exports may be a motivation for countries to recognize China. Rich and Banerjee (2015) argue that countries that don’t depend on exports may be less susceptible to Chinese pressure to abandon Taiwan. However, the case of Malawi’s rapid increase in exports is not replicated in the case of both the Gambia and Burkina Faso, where trade with China, including exports, was already rising before there was a change in ties.²

Nonetheless, the volume of Malawi’s imports from China increased even more (ANNEX 5.1). Before 2008, Malawi had less trade with China than did Niger (an average

of 25 million USD per year versus 51 million USD per year), but it also had a smaller trade deficit with China (24 million per year versus 51 million per year), and already exported more to China overall than did Niger (4 million versus 985 thousand). After 2008, Malawi's exports to China increased even further but its trade deficit also expanded (to over 100 million in 2009, and upwards to a peak of 500 million in 2019).³ Malawi's exports were primarily agricultural before 2008, providing 90% of the country's foreign exchange (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016, p. 149). Malawi's exports to China after 2008 have followed the same pattern (Nkhoma, 2020).

Nonetheless, although Malawi now receives nearly 20% of its imports from China, China is still a smaller trade partner overall than other countries in the region, particularly South Africa (Nkhoma, 2020). Furthermore, China's share of Malawi's exports peaked at 5.8% in 2015, meaning that its contribution to Malawi's GDP has never surpassed 1%.⁴ In general, Africa's agricultural exports to China have been limited despite efforts to promote them (cf. Brautigam, 2015). De Bruyn (2014) found the impact of China on Malawi's agriculture to be limited.

Chinese FDI to Malawi increased after 2008 but high levels of FDI stock were not reported until 2013.⁵ Overall, total FDI stock and flow remained higher in Niger during the whole period (400 million per year and 500 million total flow vs. 150 million per year and 85 million flow), meaning that while Malawi converged with Niger in terms of trade with China, it did not converge in terms of FDI. Nonetheless, early Chinese FDI in Malawi was concentrated in manufacturing (Thindwa, 2014, p. 51-52), generating 13,796 jobs between 2005 and 2012, a "significant" number according to Thindwa (2014, p. 60), but still substantially below some of the numbers promised. The overall contribution of industry to Malawi's GDP has hovered generally at 15% since 2001, with no visible growth after recognizing China in 2008, although in 2017 it increased to almost 19%, beating a previous record of 18% in 2007 a year before the switch.⁶

Mweningure (2017) writes that Malawi's debt to China is "most worrying to many Malawians." However, while Malawi's debt has risen over the last decade, the government reports that that only 9% of that debt was owed to China in 2019, a number which dropped to 6% in 2021.⁷

The data suggests that recognizing China has had a limited effect on improving Malawi's economic performance. As for Malawi's worsening performance in the 2010s, there were other factors. For example, in 2011, several major Western donors suspended aid to Murtharika's government on grounds of corruption. At the time, 40% of Malawi's national budget was dependent on Western aid (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016, p. 147). The suspension of aid contributed to an economic crisis, part of which was related to a lack of foreign exchange, which in turn led to anti-government demonstrations. During the demonstrations, Chinese traders, whose numbers increased after 2008, became targets of

vandalism or violence. This led to the passage of a law, supported by the Chinese Embassy, limiting where foreign traders could operate (Nkhoma, 2020). While Chinese traders were targeted, some have argued that support from “emerging donors” at the state level, including China, but also India and Arab states, may have actually lessened the scale of the economic crisis (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016, p. 150).

This example demonstrates an important fact; the economic effects or lack of effects of diplomatic relations with China may be less relevant than is sometimes assumed. China is attractive to many African leaders and populations primarily because it is an example of a formerly poor country that successfully industrialized. President Muratharika argued that diplomatic relations with China would benefit Malawi because it could learn from China’s experience and maybe even emulate it. It is worth mentioning that African leaders have also shown an interest in other East Asian states such as Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan for similar reasons.

However, Chinese diplomats, African leaders, and particularly media reports frequently oversell what investment pledges and project proposals will deliver. For example, while conducting fieldwork in Tanzania in 2015, I personally encountered frequent media reports about Chinese investment packages and plans, only to discover later that reporters had recorded investment pledges as done deals, or misreported private investment plans as projects supported by the Chinese state. Such exaggerations lead to much disappointment. For example, in Malawi at the time of the switch, many NGOs and government agencies approached the Chinese embassy directly asking for financial support, a situation which led the ambassador to say publicly that China was not a “miracle performer,” a complaint that caused a minor diplomatic incident early in the relationship (Nkhoma, 2020, p 694). When, in a ten-year retrospective of relations with China, Mweingure (2017) notes that “the country has since remained poor,” Malawian officials point to the other factors influencing long term economic growth, such as the effects of climate change.

The lesson is that decisions to recognize China are not based on straightforward guarantees of economic growth but the extent to which they can deliver visible signs of development for politicians to show their constituents in the shorter term.

Besides economic benefits, another area where Taiwan and China have competed is medical diplomacy. China has a long history of sending medical teams to Africa, and Taiwan, with its own well-developed health system, has also engaged in medical diplomacy in Africa. In Malawi, one of the biggest projects was the establishment of the Rainbow Clinic, an HIV/AIDS clinic at Mzuzu Central Hospital funded by Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) and managed by Pingtung Christian University (Hsu, 2007). Following the break in ties between Taiwan and Malawi in 2008, Taiwan’s medical team was withdrawn. As reported by China’s National Health

Commission, Malawi requested China's assistance and China provided its own medical team (NHC, 2013). However, according to a doctor who worked for the old Taiwanese team, the Chinese medics were unable to provide HIV/AIDS care, so the government approved the hospital's request to continue its relationship with Pingtung Christian University. This was permitted on a non-governmental basis alongside, but in a separate ward, from that operated by the Chinese doctors. Taiwanese media also reported that staff at Mzuzu Hospital were disappointed at the low English proficiency of the Chinese team (Luo, 2016). The head of Pingtung university used his own funds to continue operating the clinic, and through an affiliated NGO registered in Norway, continued to operate in Malawi and promote exchanges between the two sides (Liu, 2021). The ICDF has also continued to fund such projects as medical training and the management of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and hypertension in mobile populations.⁸ In 2020, Pingtung Christian University was still providing medical training and there were Taiwanese doctors involved in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic (Liu, 2021; Tsou, 2020).

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malawi and China, Beijing also became engaged in the medical sector. Following a longstanding model, a medical team was dispatched from a paired province, in this case Shanxi (Li, 2011). "Health and Medical Care" are described by Chinese officials as one of the four "pillars" of assistance alongside infrastructure, agriculture, and education (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016, 153). Studies have found that while there is appreciation for Chinese medical assistance, communication problems and a lack of transparency have produced some frustration among Malawian health workers involved in implementation (Daly et. al, 2020). Evaluating the Chinese medical team's performance in Malawi compared to Ethiopia, Grande et. al (2020, p. 21) argues that "whereas the Chinese government pays close attention to the program's visibility and messaging, far less attention is given to program improvement and performance against basic indicators." In any case, there has been a long stream of medical assistance from China, including funding for the construction of clinics, equipment donations and training.⁹ Most recently, assistance was given during the COVID-19 pandemic (Xinhua, 2021), a period in which the Pingtung Christian University program was also offering assistance (Liu, 2021).

The lesson is that delivering visible signs of development or assistance have political value, and may indeed help people, but projects may still fall short on other metrics. Nonetheless, in these cases, it is important to look at how individual actors implement programs and interact with people, which I will discuss in a section below.

5.3 Does Recognizing China Limit Policy Space for Engaging Taiwan?

There may be an assumption that countries which develop close economic relations with China will avoid contacts with Taiwan (Grimm et al., 2014, p. 37). This is related to the assumption that economic dependence translates into limited political choices. However, the opposite may be true. Within an overall situation of structural inequality and dependency, African leaders and politicians have historically taken advantage of competition among external actors. For example, African decisions to switch diplomatic ties have often been initiated by the contingencies of domestic politics rather than Chinese pressure alone. In several cases, African leaders facing organized opposition or close elections have requested more aid or contributions than Taiwan was willing to provide, leading to an opening for China. This was widely reported in the case of the Gambia (Shih, 2013), but from interviews I conducted with Taiwanese businesspeople, I heard similar stories about Chad, which according to one story broke ties in 2006 after Taiwan rejected funding the president needed to pay civil servants. What this means is that African states have more agency than the concept of “Chinese pressure” implies.

Furthermore, China has generally tolerated informal economic relations between its diplomatic partners and Taiwan, including the operation of representative offices, provided these relations don’t involve direct government-to-government interactions. However, the precise red lines may be contingent on the state of cross-strait politics. For example, China did not establish relations with the Gambia while the KMT was in power in Taiwan, seemingly upholding the “diplomatic truce”, which was contingent on Taiwan supporting the “One China” principle. When the DPP came to power in 2016, China quickly moved to recognize the Gambia and continued poaching other diplomatic partners. Nonetheless, African states may sometimes take initiatives on their own against Taiwan even without evidence of Chinese pressure. The complicated interaction between when and how China applies pressure, and the political motivations of African leaders, mean that greater economic dependence on China is not necessarily correlated with greater limitations on relations with Taiwan.

5.3.1 Case Study: South Africa

Apartheid South Africa developed a close relationship with Taiwan during the later stages of the Cold War. Starting in the 1980s, South Africa encouraged Taiwanese people to migrate and invest in industries near the so-called “Homelands”, and the Taiwanese population reached a peak of at least 50,000 in the 1990s (Park, 2017, p. 32). However, despite Taiwan’s association with the apartheid government, and support for recognizing China within the new government, the ANC did not immediately break ties after democratization. Ideologically, the African National Congress (ANC) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were natural allies. However, the ANC was historically closer to the Soviet Union and was therefore on the opposite side to China during the Angolan civil

war (Taylor, 2000). Furthermore, during the democratization process, Taiwan tried to maintain its relations with South Africa by developing ties with the ANC, providing funding for their 1994 election campaign (Davis 1998) and funding for the Reconstruction and Development Program (Anthony & Kim, 2017, p. 206).

President Nelson Mandela made a concerted but ultimately fruitless effort to convince China to accept dual recognition (Williams & Hurst, 2018). The decision to accept China's terms for establishing diplomatic relations were eventually justified within South Africa on economic rather than ideological grounds. China provided a larger future market for South African exports and for investment than Taiwan. In the 1990s, Taiwan was still one of South Africa's largest trading partners, but it could not compete with China (Anthony & Kim, 2017, p. 208). The second reason was that China indicated that South Africa's access to Hong Kong, where South Africa maintained crucial business links, might be disrupted if it continued to recognize Taiwan (Lin, 2007).

Nonetheless, despite agreeing to China's terms, South Africa gave Taiwan a 13-month transition period, making the switch in diplomatic ties relatively amicable (Alden and Wu, 2014). The embassies were replaced by liaison offices. Despite the suspension of official development programs, trade and investment at the private level between South Africa and Taiwan continued as before. In 1999, there were still 311 Taiwanese-run factories, an increase from de-recognition the year before (Lin, 2007, p. 340). The subsequent decline and repatriation of Taiwanese has been attributed to concerns about security and labor conflicts rather than the absence of diplomatic relations (Anthony & Kim, 2017), something echoed in interviews I conducted with Taiwanese residents of South Africa.

South Africa's diplomatic and economic relationship with China has grown closer since, with South Africa invited into the BRICs group and being upgraded by China to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2013. Intra-party exchanges between the ANC and CCP have also deepened, to the extent that the CCP helped the ANC establish its own political school modeled on the CCP (Benabdallah, 2020). This relationship has led allegations that South Africa is becoming increasingly dependent on China. South Africa has, for example, repeatedly denied visas to the Dalai Lama, a decision criticized for putting business interests ahead of the country's reputation as a human rights defender. The late Archbishop Desmond Tutu was one of many senior figures to speak out against the decision (Park 2017, 43; Muresan & Naidu, 2021). According to one South African official I spoke to, the relationship is "frank and open" and based on "mutual respect" which serves South Africa's interests. Despite this, South Africa and Taiwan have maintained not just business links, but also unofficial political ties. These include economic cooperation, dialogue forums (Tseng, 2008) and contacts between Taiwanese politicians and South African parliamentarians (albeit largely opposition members). (Schultz & Chang, 2019). Nonetheless, the absence of diplomatic ties means that Taiwan can't communicate directly

with South African officials and must rely on lower levels of the bureaucracy (including the deputy minister level), or the mediation of non-state actors (Anthony & Kim, 2017, p. 209).

Anthony and Kim, writing about the early 2010s, interpret China's tolerance of these unofficial links to be reflective of a form of "economic pragmatism" which characterizes not just cross-strait relations, but globalization more generally. According to this interpretation, China would only interfere in South Africa-Taiwan relations if they became "political." This state of affairs may have changed in the late 2010s. Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen, China suspended the so-called "diplomatic truce," establishing ties with the Gambia three years after it had broken with Taiwan and moving forward to establish ties with Sao Tome and Principe and Burkina Faso. Beijing also put pressure on Eswatini, with the former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Lin Songtian, stating that the southern African kingdom might suffer consequences if it continued to recognize Taiwan (du Plessis, 2020). The ambassador had raised the specter of economic coercion, although any such measures have yet to materialize.

While China has not challenged the presence of Taiwan's liaison offices in South Africa, the Solly Msimanga scandal may reflect new circumstances. In December 2016, Solly Msimanga, the Mayor of Tshwane in Pretoria and a member of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), visited Taipei at the invitation of the mayor, Ko Wen-Je. His visit not only received public condemnation from the Chinese embassy in South Africa, but also from South Africa's foreign ministry and the governing ANC, both of which accused Msimanga of contravening South Africa's foreign policy by engaging in government-to-government meetings (China File, 2017). Such actions should also be seen in the context of domestic politics. Besides the DA, another opposition party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has also had close ties with Taiwan since the early 1990s. It took part in delegations to Taiwan in 2016, 2018 and 2019, each time prompting complaints from the Chinese embassy (October, 2016; Shange, 2018). According to a South African official, the government is now discouraging reciprocal visits between politicians.

Grimm, Kim, and Anthony, operating on the assumption that China tolerates business links that fall short of political contacts, argue that South Africa and others may have succumbed to a "culture of self-censorship" (2014, p. 37) by cutting links with Taipei above and beyond any mandate from Beijing. This implies that South Africa and other African governments may have greater space for engaging Taiwan but have chosen not to out of an abundance of caution.

5.3.2 Case Study: Angola and Nigeria

Taiwan has never had formal diplomatic relations with either Angola or Nigeria. Nonetheless, they are Taiwan's two largest trade partners in Africa after South Africa.

Angola and Nigeria have also developed close economic relations with China over the past two decades, but to different degrees. Angola and Nigeria are both oil exporters, but whereas Angola's economy is primarily dependent on oil exports (86.7% of exports in 2019, with exports being 39% of GDP), Nigeria's economy is more diversified (oil 72% of exports but exports only 12% of GDP); and whereas Angola's primary oil customer is China (62.4% in 2019), Nigeria's customers are more diverse (China took only 3.95% in 2019).¹⁰ Finally, China's investment in Angola, and Angola's debt to China, are greater than Nigeria's. A cursory glance would suggest that Angola has been more dependent on China than Nigeria (ANNEX 5.2). However, an examination of Nigeria and Angola's recent political relations with Taiwan and China suggests the situation is more complicated.

Taiwan established a trade office in Lagos in 1991, the same year Nigeria moved its capital to Abuja (Abubakar, 2021). In 2001, Taiwan also moved its trade office to Abuja, prompting complaints from China that it was behaving like an embassy. In 2004, the Nigerian government attempted to evict the office from the capital and force it back to Lagos, using the military to close it down for five months. However, following negotiations, the office was allowed to remain (Vanguard, 2017). Nigeria may have attempted to assuage Beijing by publicly endorsing China's enactment of its "Anti-Secession Law" the following year. The office itself remained unmolested until January 2017 when Nigeria abruptly ordered Taiwan to move it back to Lagos and to change the name in its title from "Taiwan" to "Taipei" (Oshodi, 2018). During the confrontation, Nigeria even asked its director, Morgan Chao, to leave Nigeria saying that his safety could not be guaranteed. In June, the military was sent in to evict the staff and seal the premises.

What had happened? Why did Nigeria suddenly become hostile to Taiwan? In the wake of the incident, there were multiple interpretations. One report drew a connection between the eviction and a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, to Nigeria around the same time. Wang pledged US\$40 billion in funding for infrastructure construction during the visit (Oshodi, 2018). According to this narrative, Nigeria's move was either requested by the Chinese or was done proactively as a favor. Another interpretation is that Nigeria wanted to improve relations with China in exchange for support for Nigeria's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council (Abubakar, 2021). Oshodi (2018) argues that Nigerian officials may have natural sympathy for China's sovereignty claims over Taiwan given Nigeria's own history with independence movements in Biafra.

According to a Nigerian official I interviewed, the impetus for the move was not due to any change on the Nigerian side but the changing relationship between Taiwan and China. The official would not confirm which side initiated the move but said the full closure of the Taiwanese office had been considered. However, when reviewing the original 1990 MOU, the Nigerians discovered that while the office was allowed to engage in economic activities, it was forbidden from any "political" role.

During an interview with a Taiwanese businessperson, I heard another story which attributes the incident to the individual initiative by China's ambassador to Nigeria. According to this account, the ambassador, seeking to impress his superiors in Beijing, approached one of President Buhari's secretaries and "bribed" him to bring the matter before the president. Buhari signed the order but that did not guarantee the authorities would actually enforce it, so the ambassador also "bribed" the local police to act on the order. Although the veracity of these stories cannot be verified, they point to the fact that there are a range of different interests and actors on both the Nigerian and Chinese sides.

Nonetheless, providing a diplomatic assessment of the move, the Nigerian official I interviewed argued that the move may have been a blessing in disguise for Taiwan. While Abuja is the official capital, Lagos is the economic center of Nigeria and the economic hub for all of West Africa. The official observed that Taiwan's office became more active after the move and bilateral trade increased.

By comparison, Angola's trade dependency on China has shown little sign of succumbing to political dependency. Following the end of a two-decade civil war, Angola accepted a \$2 Billion oil-backed reconstruction loan from China and welcomed Chinese construction companies and thousands of workers into the country to fulfill the contracts. As Lucy Corkin described it in 2011, the relationship was a "marriage of convenience." China had had a less amicable relationship with Angola than with other African states during the Cold War because, alongside the US and South Africa, Beijing had backed the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the Soviet-backed government which eventually prevailed. During the early 1990s, when prices for oil were still low, Angola explored the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Campos & Vines, 2008). In 1992, Taiwan opened a representative office in Angola but closed it in 2001 on its own initiative. Angola's acceptance of the Chinese loan in 2004 after the end of the Civil War in 2002 reflected a larger strategy on the part of Angolan leaders to diversify reconstruction financing (Corkin, 2011). An IMF package they had rejected had included political conditionality and transparency reporting requirements; the Chinese loan did not. Rather than making Angola dependent on China the strategy may have reflected Angola's desire to "diversify dependency" beyond the IMF (de Carvalho et. al, 2021).

Nonetheless, Angola's positive economic performance in the following decade was dependent on high oil prices, driven by Chinese demand, and China itself was the primary importer of Angolan oil. Following the drop in oil prices in the mid-2010s, however, Angola's debt to China, payable in kind, had become a liability (ibid.).

Furthermore, following a political transition in 2017, the new government has investigated business deals made by its predecessor, threatening the position of Chinese companies whose privileges depended on connections with officials now out of power

(ibid.). Finally, notwithstanding geopolitical jitters in the 2000s about China taking over Angola's oil blocks, China's direct control of oil exploration and drilling in Angola is still limited, and most of the production is still controlled by Western oil companies. Furthermore, exploration of deep-sea oil fields remains dominated by Western companies and technology (ibid.).

This suggests China may be more dependent on Angola than vice versa, one reason it has sought to diversify its own oil supplies. Angola may, from one perspective, have greater latitude to develop relations with Taiwan. Angola was Taiwan's largest trade partner in Africa in 2006 and remains the second largest today. However, this trade relationship is mediated through the international oil market, not any direct linkages. Taiwan closed its office early in 2001 and there are no more than twenty Taiwanese people in Angola today. They are far outnumbered by the Chinese business community which has had longer experience and closer relationships with Angolan officials. Notwithstanding claims that the Angola-China relationship is "on the rocks" (ibid.), these people-to-people relationships likely mitigate against a conspicuous diplomatic push by Taiwan.

5.3.3 The Motivations of African Political Actors

African states have pursued closer ties with China, sometimes at the expense of relations with Taiwan, for a variety of reasons. The history and memory of Third World solidarity is important, particularly in countries like Tanzania, and it features prominently in diplomatic rhetoric. However, the motivations for why any particular political leader pursues closer relations with China are more complex.

Economic benefits, as discussed above, are always a key factor whoever the donor may be. As one official from an African country told me in Taiwan, "The agenda of the continent is not secret - it's about infrastructure, health, poverty alleviation, job creation, industrialization...if you meet us there, I think you're going to be welcomed." China is welcomed because it is perceived to deliver specific goods. For example, multiple officials mentioned FOAC, the China Import-Export Bank and the New Development Bank as specific points of attraction. Officials from Somaliland also noted the appeal of China's "non-interference" policy but pointed out that attitudes may now be changing because of concern about debt burdens and "economic colonization." African officials based in Taiwan nonetheless emphasized that Taiwan had a positive role to play if it could align itself with Africa's priorities. For example, a Nigerian official mentioned technology transfer as something Taiwan was capable of providing.

Besides any interest in attracting investment, there are also regional political and geopolitical factors. For example, both Nigeria and South Africa want to be members of the UN Security Council or at least promote UN reform. A South African official pointed to China's support for South Africa's membership of the BRICS grouping as an important

gain from the relationship. Somaliland, by contrast, sees little prospect of gaining Chinese recognition of its independence. An official said the de facto state therefore saw little risk in establishing informal relations with Taiwan, with which it feels a natural solidarity because of their international marginalization. China has little scope to retaliate against Somaliland because they have little trade, and the Somalilanders who do business in China use foreign passports anyway. In addition, Somaliland's outreach to Taiwan appears to some extent to be aimed at an audience in the United States. For example, during a recent visit to Washington, representatives from Somaliland lobbied congress for support by emphasizing the ties they had established with Taiwan. They framed the relationship in the context of "opposing" China in Africa (Kine, 2021). The narrative may not reflect the full complexities of Africa's relationships with China, but Somaliland's appeal to "New Cold War" sentiment in the United States may reflect a strategy to use Taiwan to leverage more support from the United States. This is, of course, similar to what Taiwan has been doing to bolster support for its own security.

However, a more mundane motivation is that of politicians seeking to consolidate support by channeling resources from powerful outside actors, a condition of so-called "dependent agency" (Bayart, 2000). The interests of political actors in establishing ties with Taiwan in the 1990s or establishing ties with China after the 2000s reflect this. While the prospects for establishing diplomatic ties, or setting up representative offices, may be limited, Taiwanese businesses have greater opportunities. As one Taiwanese businessperson I interviewed explained, no African government minister would turn them away if they came to propose building a factory.

5.4 Grassroots Economic and Social Relations Between Africa and Taiwan

The emphasis on government-to-government relations between Taiwan and Africa may be useful for demonstrating Taiwan's sovereignty but a state-centered approach can undervalue the role of people-to-people contacts. Not only have informal ties in business and civil society helped maintain connections to Africa in the absence of diplomatic ties, they have also provided resources for Taiwan's foreign policy in terms of social capital and expertise in places the Taiwanese state can't go. Nonetheless, private sector actors I interviewed said that Taiwan's government retains a traditional mindset about relations with Africa and does not fully utilize or support the networks and expertise developed by such individuals.

In order to understand how private actors have developed and maintained relations between Taiwan and Africa, it is necessary to look beyond the four cases discussed above (Malawi, South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola) and consider Taiwanese engagements across Africa. The following sections are based on interviews with Taiwanese businesspeople and NGO workers conducted in Taiwan.

5.4.1 *How Private Actors have Developed Relations between Taiwan and Africa*

The Taiwanese were among the earliest “ethnic Chinese” actors in post-colonial Africa. The largest number went to South Africa, reaching at least 50,000 in the 1990s (Park, 2017). Before 1998, there were 620 Taiwanese businesses in South Africa with a total capital investment of \$US 1.5 billion, employing 45,000 people (Anthony & Kim, 2017). While these numbers have declined, people-to-people relations with South Africa remain the closest. Continent-wide, in 2020, according to Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council, there were 10,000 Taiwanese operating 400 businesses across 28 African countries. Although they are outnumbered by Chinese migrants, some Taiwanese, on account of being earlier arrivals, are prominent figures in what is locally considered the “Chinese community.” In Ghana, a Taiwanese man I interviewed, who first arrived in the early 1980s, is now a well-known industrialist. In Nigeria, the head of the Taiwanese business association is developing the first Taiwanese-owned industrial park in the country. In Uganda and Tanzania, Taiwanese have headed Chinese business associations. In Ghana and Cameroon, the head of a customs clearance house has established a Taiwan showroom featuring Taiwanese products. In Malawi, in 2008, the same year ties were cut, a Taiwanese social enterprise investor, in collaboration with European NGOs, developed a coffee enterprise selling seeds to smallholder farmers and purchasing their yields. He has politically connected friends and has been invited by neighboring countries to invest there as well.

Many of these individuals and their families established their businesses, livelihoods and relationships independent of the Taiwanese government. They established themselves in countries with which Taiwan has never had diplomatic relations.

More recently, a younger generation of Taiwanese have established ties with Africa through NGOs (both Taiwan-based and international),¹¹ churches¹² and Taiwan-based Buddhist charity organizations (such as Tzu Chi¹³ and the Amitofo Care Center¹⁴). African students from countries other than Taiwan’s diplomatic partners have also arrived in Taiwan through partnerships between universities and foreign NGOs.¹⁵ Other organizations, like Wow Africa,¹⁶ have established media platforms designed to improve knowledge about Africa in Taiwan. Tsou (2020) lists 18 different NGOs from Taiwan that are active in Africa in health, social welfare and agriculture.

These efforts supplement those of organizations like the Taiwan-Africa Business Association (TABA) and the government sponsored Africa-Taiwan Economic Forum (ATEF), which have organized trade delegations and seminars in collaboration with African representatives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Overseas Community council to promote trade investment.

5.4.2 *How People-to-People Relations have promoted diplomatic relations*

Taiwanese private actors have had greater mobility and freedom of access in Africa than Taiwanese government officials, meaning that some have personal networks with local high-ranking officials. For example, a Taiwanese businessperson based in one African country was able to negotiate the passage of athletes competing in the 2017 Universidad from being blocked by that country's border control. In the past, Taiwan's diplomacy in Africa has depended, in a quiet way, on the social capital of these networks. One such person I interviewed, a man who began doing business in Africa in the 1980s leading business delegations, developed such a wide network of contacts that Taiwan's government often recruited him for sensitive negotiations with African leaders who were contemplating breaking ties. In Nigeria, it was the head of the Taiwanese Business Association, who assisted the trade office in finding a new location after being evicted from Abuja. In order to forestall the possibility of China pressuring a Nigerian landlord in the future, this individual purchased the property himself to let to Taiwan's trade office.

Perhaps the most successful recent example of non-state ties supporting diplomatic relations is the establishment of informal relations between Taiwan and Somaliland. Volunteers from the Taiwan Root Medical Corps (TRMC) were the first to go to Somaliland, laying a bridge for the later establishment of relations (Tsou 2020, p. 23). Indeed, one of the officials at Somaliland's office in Taiwan first came to Taiwan on a Taiwan MOFA scholarship several years before ties were established.

Taiwanese in Africa nonetheless have to walk a thin line given the presence of China. The people I have interviewed generally agree that China does not directly interfere in their economic or social activities unless it is too "political." One person considered this a form of pressure, explaining how displaying a Taiwanese flag in the office, or arranging Double Ten (national day) celebrations, can lead to friction. Taiwanese who have played more active roles facilitating contacts between African and Taiwanese officials have faced greater challenges. For example, the government of Mozambique ran a trade office in Taipei for several years through the efforts of a young Taiwanese man who was raised in South Africa and Mozambique after his family migrated there in the 1990s. According to my interview with him, the office in Taipei was eventually closed by Mozambique due to pressure from the Chinese government. The individual who helped the Taiwanese government negotiate with African governments (see above) told me that he used to have no trouble traveling or giving talks at trade exhibitions, but that he was now often blocked.

Nonetheless, many Taiwanese in Africa consider it practical to maintain cordial relations with Chinese embassies mindful that they can offer assistance, such as during the pandemic. Some of this is a deliberate attempt to win Taiwanese sympathy. Indeed, several interviewees claimed that in the past they had received more preferential treatment than mainlanders. For example, Taiwanese who showed up at some Chinese embassies applying

for their Taiwan Compatriot Pass (the document China provides Taiwanese in lieu of a visa for visiting China) would be served on the spot rather than being asked to make an appointment online first. According to one interviewee, however, this has changed in the past few years. However, when a Chinese embassy extends invitations to events, some will politely attend, insisting nonetheless that they maintain red lines. Some said they socialize with Chinese people and even officials in non-political settings but avoid explicitly political settings such as the Overseas Chinese Association for the Peaceful Unification of China. Maintaining good relations with Chinese people is important for Taiwanese businesspeople because many rely on them as customers or even business partners. As one Taiwanese businessperson implied the purpose of maintaining of good relations with Chinese officials was that turning down invitations to such events as Chinese New Year celebrations might mark them as pro-independence, and possibly negatively affect their business. As another businessperson argued, it is a good idea to maintain cordial relations with the Chinese Embassy because “they can help you” in the event of trouble, especially given the lack of a Taiwanese diplomatic presence. Those Taiwanese who maintained a distance from “political” activities implied that they did so for the simple reason of patriotism towards their own country.

5.4.3 The Limits and Vulnerabilities of State-to-State Relations

A frequent criticism from private Taiwanese actors is that their government has not done enough to promote or support investment in Africa. This is despite the president’s “Africa Plan,” established in 2018, which has in fact depended on the Overseas Community Affairs Council, and the Taiwan-Africa Business Association, to mobilize Taiwan’s existing business networks in Africa. Nonetheless, the government’s activities have been criticized as limited primarily to educational seminars and verbal encouragement. Instead, as several interviewees argue, the government should provide material incentives and support for investors and consider ways of collaborating with third parties from other countries to jointly support projects.

Rich and Banerjee (2015) write that “economic diplomacy offers Taiwan options to expand its role in international relations where formal diplomatic recognition is unlikely.” However, Taiwan alone can’t compete on the same scale as China. Taiwanese businesspeople in Africa also don’t necessarily see themselves in direct competition with Chinese businesses. Instead, they are trying to develop a niche offering higher quality products and services. Multiple interviewees pointed to the sale of Taiwanese machinery as an area where Taiwanese can compete on quality and service. In that respect, their positioning is similar to other countries competing on their country-brand in Africa (such as Turkey).

The challenge is the cultural gap between government officials and business or civil society actors. Taiwan’s government is hesitant to interfere in the “free market” by directly

supporting businesses. By contrast, there is a perception that the Chinese state does much more to support at least its SOEs in Africa. The challenge, according to one African official, is that Taiwanese businesspeople are very cautious about investing in Africa due to a lack of sufficient information. In the case of Somaliland, the official argues more could be done to help the government survey the country's resources and opportunities. Another official observed that Chinese investors tend to be better informed about Africa than their Taiwanese counterparts.

On the other hand, business and civil society leaders criticize a traditional mindset which places too much attention on diplomatic partners rather than building relationships everywhere, and which understands economic relations with Africa too much in terms of "aid" rather than "business." Taiwanese businesspeople, especially those with long-term experience in Africa, emphasize the body of expertise they possess, implying that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacks sufficient area expertise in Africa. This is underlined by the fact there is no dedicated research institute in Taiwan for African studies. This is despite the fact there was a small surge in the number of African diplomatic partners during the 1990s. The comparison with the development of Southeast Asian studies in Taiwan is instructive. Academic connections between Taiwan and Africa have therefore been largely on a person-to-person level. Indeed, the first African research center was opened at National Chung Hsing University in 2018 by a single professor, an agricultural engineer by training, who has collaborated with various NGOs on projects in multiple African countries.¹⁷ However, he has been unable to receive funding from MOFA, which would only fund the center if it was holding events during formal diplomatic events like hosting the King of Eswatini during his visits to Taiwan.

The Taiwan government supports NGO initiatives through agencies like the ICDF (Tsou 2020), but despite some exceptions, interviewees said there was much institutional pressure to focus on regions where Taiwan has a diplomatic presence. When countries break ties with Taiwan, or impose difficulties on Taiwan, the standard diplomatic response has been the principle of reciprocity. Nonetheless, the people I have interviewed have found these actions counter-productive because they unnecessarily damage informal links which can be preserved to the advantage of Taiwan even after a formal break in ties. For example, one of the most controversial actions taken by Taiwan after a break in ties is the suspension of scholarships for students, often in the middle of their semester. Several interviewees pointed out that punishing students for the actions of their governments neglects the role the students could play in future relations. For example, engineering students may become customers for Taiwan's machinery exports, while other may continue to feel gratitude for Taiwan's role in their education. It is worth mentioning that educational networks are one of the ways China has developed rapport with African countries (Benabdallah, 2020). MOFA, the Ministry of Education, and the Taiwan International

Graduate Program (TIGP) do offer international scholarships, and there are African students from non-diplomatic partners in Taiwan, but the limited number of Taiwan representative offices in Africa limits their reach. There are also private recruitment efforts. However, close oversight of educational exchanges is necessary, especially those led by private universities, which have repeatedly lured foreign students to Taiwan on false promises of education while placing them in exploitative factory work (Yang, 2022). This can be very damaging for Taiwan's reputation.

Taiwanese private actors have occasionally taken steps to preserve ties after diplomatic breaks, such as extending tuition and living support to students stranded in Taiwan. The same is true for projects in Africa. When Taiwan cut funding from its programs in Malawi after 2008, Pingtung Christian Hospital and its owner took over the funding and operation of the Taiwan-built Rainbow AIDS clinic (Liu, 2021). For comparison, Chinese private actors have also been an important part of China-Africa relations. For example, in Burkina Faso, relations between Chinese wholesale traders and Burkinabe businesspeople established a constituency in favor of diplomatic relations years before the government switched ties in 2018 (Mohammad, 2018).

While it is unlikely that Taiwan will create a lobby for reestablishing formal ties, creating a constituency of people friendly to Taiwan can help in other ways. This is important because most people in Africa, like elsewhere, don't understand the nuances of the China-Taiwan conflict. When African governments release statements supporting China's positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong or Xinjiang, it partly reflects their suspicion of the West, but it also reflects the low stakes and low opportunity costs involved. Maintaining channels of communication at least ensures there is some level of opportunity for people to hear Taiwan's story from ordinary Taiwanese themselves rather than from either Western or Chinese media. As one Taiwanese engaged in NGO projects in Africa explained it to me, his only "condition" for assistance is that if Taiwan ever gets attacked by China, they will at least say something publicly on Taiwan's behalf. According to Pingtung Christian University, local officials in Malawi have expressed gratitude that Taiwanese have continued to help in the medical field despite the loss of formal ties (Tsou 2020, p.16).

A wide network of people-to-people relations may be more dependable than government-to-government relations, which are vulnerable to not just Chinese pressure, but more fundamentally to the decisions of a limited number of African political actors. As in the case of China, Taiwan's high-level relationships with African countries have primarily been close relationships with rulers and political elites. This makes Taiwan's diplomatic relations particularly vulnerable to the whims of individual leaders or to political changes in leadership. An official from Somaliland stressed to me that Taiwan needed to have a close understanding of what they called "tribal" issues, that is, which

group is in power and which is not. Reviewing the history of diplomatic switches, Bhaso Ndzendze (2020) observes that “Of the four states that were not new democracies but still switched (i.e., Senegal, Chad, Malawi and São Tomé and Príncipe), three (Chad, Malawi and São Tomé and Príncipe) did so within a year of an upcoming election following a declining performance in the preceding presidential election by the incumbent leaders.”

The other reason this situation makes Taiwan vulnerable is that it links the legitimacy of relations with Taiwan to the legitimacy of the ruler. For example, Rich and Banerjee (2015) have found statistically that in the past the less democratic an African country was the more likely it was to recognize Taiwan. China faces similar challenges as the case of Angola after the end of the De Santos regime demonstrates.

These facts raise uncomfortable questions about the long-term sustainability of Taiwan’s relations with its last formal diplomatic partner in Africa, the Kingdom of Eswatini, which international news reports never fail to remind us is Africa’s last “absolute monarchy.” Given Eswatini’s importance to MOFA, the country receives prominent attention at government sponsored events in Taipei. Taiwanese diplomats and businesspeople I have spoken to all describe their relationships with the king in glowing personal terms as a close friend who is a strong supporter of Taiwan. While this may reassure them of Eswatini's friendliness to Taiwan, last year’s violent pro-democracy and anti-monarchy demonstrations in the country, and their subsequent repression by the state, indicate a risk for Taiwan's relations in the event of democratization or political transition (Dlamini, 2021).

This poses a dilemma for Taiwan’s argument that its foreign policy is based on democratic values and that the countries it has the closest ties to are also democracies. The argument holds if Taiwan keeps the focus on its informal relations with Lithuania or even Somaliland but is less convincing for pro-democratic opponents of the government in Eswatini as well as opponents of Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in Africa. Historically, African states that recognized Taiwan were more likely to be undemocratic and democratization in those states has usually led to the recognition of China (Rich & Banerjee, 2015). This dilemma is by no means unique to Taiwan, reflecting the contradictions between what countries would like to believe about themselves and the pragmatic choices they make. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the contradiction and recognize how it affects how one’s country is perceived. The fact South Africa didn’t immediately break ties with Taiwan after 1994 is one example of how Taiwan protected itself by getting on board with democratic trends. Of course, if Taiwan was to start getting visibly close to Eswatini’s opposition, that could have the effect of pushing the government towards China. In either case, the long-term endurance of Eswatini’s ties with Taiwan will ultimately depend on how Swazi society at large feels about the relationship.

5.5 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter have been that a closer diplomatic relationship with China does not automatically translate into greater overall economic growth because there are many other factors affecting economic performance. Likewise, greater economic dependency on China does not necessarily mean a reduction in a state's policy space, meaning there may be more scope for informal engagements with Taiwan. Nonetheless, for Taiwan, economic and social relations promoted by people-to-people relations with African countries may have a key role in extending relations beyond the limits of formal ties. As one Taiwanese entrepreneur explained, Taiwan should seek to have as many global relationships as possible because relationships are a good in themselves.

NOTES

¹ The selection of these four cases is based primarily on their importance as Taiwan's top trade partners in Africa. In terms of conducting DID analysis on the effects of switching ties to China, most of the cases occurring after the 2006 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (the Gambia (2016), Sao Tome and Principe(2016), Burkina Faso (2018)) are too recent for long-term effects to be measured. Malawi, a long-partner which switched ties in 2008, offers a case with more data and existing scholarship.

² UN Comtrade Data, accessed from trademap.org.

³ UN Comtrade Data, accessed from trademap.org.

⁴ UN Comtrade Data, accessed from trademap.org.

⁵ SAIS-CARI Data.

⁶ World Bank data.

⁷ Data from Malawi Ministry of Finance <https://www.finance.gov.mw/>

⁸ Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund <https://www.icdf.org.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=30817&CtUnit=172&BaseDSD=100&mp=2>

⁹ AIDDATA. Global Chinese Development Finance Database, version 2.0., accessed from <https://china.aiddata.org/>

¹⁰ Data from UN Comtrade Data, World Bank Data, and the Observatory of Economic Complexity (oec.world)

¹¹ Love Binti (<https://www.lovebinti.org/mission>); 還有我 And Me Taiwan (<https://www.facebook.com/andmetaiwan/>)

¹² Step30 International Ministries (<https://www.step30.org/>)

¹³ https://www.tzuchi.org.tw/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=87&Itemid=272

¹⁴ <https://www.acc.org.tw/en/text?id=2>

¹⁵ For example, the International Program for Sustainable Development, in cooperation with the Jane Goodall Institute, at Chang Jung Christian University (<https://dweb.cjcu.edu.tw/ipsd?lang=en>)

¹⁶ <https://wowafrica.tw/>

¹⁶ http://amebse.nchu.edu.tw/new_page_81.htm

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
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ANNEX 5.1 China-Malawi Trade



ANNEX 5.2 Nigeria vs. Angola Trade Dependency on China

